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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3976 
___________ 
 
DEREK A. CAPOZZI, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PIGOS, MD; MARC HOLBROOK, MD; MICHAEL J. GROWSE, MD;  
COLL, MD; VARIOUS OTHER (UNKNOWN) B.O.P. EMPLOYEES;  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-11-cv-01628) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 3, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 22, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Derek Capozzi appeals the District Court’s orders granting 
summary judgment to the defendants and denying his request for leave to supplement his 
complaint.  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and 
remand. 
Capozzi, a federal inmate serving a lengthy sentence, filed a Bivens action against 
numerous defendants in 2011.  As pertinent here, Capozzi claimed that the defendants 
provided him with inadequate medical treatment.  Capozzi was initially injured in March 
2008 when a fellow prisoner stabbed him several times in the neck and chest.  Doctors 
performed surgery, but Capozzi claimed that he continued to experience chest pain.  In 
June 2009, he underwent an echocardiogram, and was diagnosed with having a fistula 
from his proximal ascending aorta to his right ventricle — which he refers to as a hole in 
his heart.  Since then, Capozzi has repeatedly requested surgical intervention, but his 
doctors, while providing him with various types of treatment, have declined to order 
surgery.  Capozzi contends that the doctors’ failure to perform surgery constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
In July 2012, Capozzi sought to supplement his complaint to add a claim of 
retaliation.  He alleged that in June 2012, he was temporarily transferred to the Fayette 
County (Kentucky) Detention Center to stand trial for charges relating to his April 2010 
escape from prison.  Fayette County is a state facility with very restrictive conditions and 
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limited medical resources.  Capozzi had sought to be placed in FMC-Lexington, the 
facility where he had been held from April 2010 until July 2011, but was refused.  
Capozzi alleged that officials from FMC-Lexington prevented him from being held there 
in retaliation for his naming them as defendants in his initial Bivens complaint. 
The District Court denied all relief to Capozzi.  First, the Court denied Capozzi’s 
request to supplement his complaint, holding that adding the retaliation claim would be 
futile because Capozzi had not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to that 
claim.  Subsequently, the Court, adopting in part a Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation, granted summary judgment to the defendants on Capozzi’s Eighth 
Amendment claim.  The Court held that, while Capozzi clearly disagreed with the 
defendants’ medical decisions, he could not show that they had been deliberately 
indifferent to his medical needs.  Capozzi filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.1 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See generally Gen. Ceramics 
Inc. v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 651 (3d Cir. 1995).  We exercise a plenary 
standard of review as to the summary-judgment order, State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009), and review the order denying leave 
to supplement for abuse of discretion, see Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 
F.2d 1185, 1189 (3d Cir. 1979). 
                                              
1 In his initial complaint, Capozzi included a number of additional claims, but he 
voluntarily dismissed those claims and has stated in his brief that they are not at issue in 
this appeal. 
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 We agree with the District Court’s summary-judgment decision.  To state a viable 
Eighth Amendment claim, Capozzi was required to show that the defendants were 
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
104 (1976).  “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly 
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d 
Cir. 2009). 
 As the District Court held, Capozzi’s Eighth Amendment claim involves, at 
bottom, a dispute with his doctors over whether surgery is currently appropriate.  The 
record reveals that, since Capozzi’s initial surgery, medical providers have continually 
monitored Capozzi’s condition; Capozzi has had frequent appointments with doctors, 
been prescribed medication to alleviate his symptoms, underwent numerous 
echocardiograms, and worn a Holter monitor for a 24-hour period.  In June 2009, Dr. 
Mohammed Imam advised that surgery might be appropriate, but stated that Capozzi’s 
case would have to be reviewed in further detail before any decisions were made.  In 
October 2009, Dr. Azhar Aslam reported that “the risks of surgical repair of his condition 
would not be suitable considering his overall clinical stability.”  Subsequently, various 
medical providers have reiterated Dr. Aslam’s conclusion.   
 While Capozzi believes that his condition requires surgical intervention, we have 
recognized that courts will “disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or 
adequacy of a particular course of treatment[,] which remains a question of sound 
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professional judgment.”  Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (internal alterations, quotation marks omitted)).  Therefore, the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment on this claim to the defendants.  See generally 
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that “mere disagreement as 
to the proper medical treatment” is insufficient to state a constitutional violation 
(alteration, quotation marks omitted)).2 
However, we conclude that the District Court erred in concluding that it would be 
futile for Capozzi to supplement his complaint to assert a retaliation claim.  Under the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust all “available” administrative 
remedies prior to bringing suit.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see generally Porter v. Nussle, 534 
U.S. 516, 532 (2002).  Here, the defendants acknowledge that administrative remedies 
were not available to Capozzi during his incarceration in the Fayette County Detention 
Center, which is where he was held at the time that he filed his motion to supplement.  
The District Court concluded that remedies were nevertheless available under § 1997e(a) 
because Capozzi was subsequently returned to federal custody, where his access to 
                                              
2 Capozzi disputes the assertion, which is included in a few of the medical reports, that he 
was able to exercise strenuously and do ten sets of 50 push-ups a day.  That dispute, 
however, is not material to our resolution of Capozzi’s Eighth Amendment claim.  See 
generally Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Nor can Capozzi survive summary judgment by alleging, generally, that the defendants 
have “lied” about his condition.  See Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 
(3d Cir. 2002) (“conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion 
for summary judgment”).  
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administrative relief was restored (and where he could have requested permission to file 
an untimely grievance, see 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b)).   
We are not persuaded that administrative remedies were available to Capozzi in 
these circumstances.  Under the defendants’ rationale, administrative remedies apparently 
were not available to Capozzi at the time that he filed, remained unavailable when the 
Magistrate Judge ruled on the motion to supplement, but then became available by the 
time that the District Court reviewed Capozzi’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 
order.  This rule unnecessarily complicates the analysis to be performed by district courts.  
It would likewise place a prisoner like Capozzi in a quandary: he would be forced to 
choose between (a) waiting to vindicate what he believed to be a violation of his 
constitutional rights until, sometime in the unknown future,3 he was transferred back to 
federal custody, or (b) filing a complaint that could be subject to dismissal when transfer 
did occur.  See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (stressing that 
exhaustion must be completed before the suit is filed).   
The plain language of the PLRA — which, in referring to administrative remedies 
“as are available,” suggests that prisoners must exhaust those remedies that exist at the 
time that they bring the action, cf. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 
2001) (en banc) (so construing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) — does not require such uncertainty.  
                                              
3 It appears that Capozzi was previously held in Kentucky pending trial for more than 14 
months. 
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Thus, in these unusual circumstances, we conclude that the District Court erred in 
denying leave to supplement on the ground that administrative remedies were available to 
Capozzi.4  
Accordingly, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.  Capozzi’s motion 
for oral argument and appointment of counsel is denied.  
                                              
4 We express no opinion as to whether the retaliation claim is meritorious or whether the 
defendants might challenge the motion to supplement on other grounds.   
